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We revisit the question of price formation in general equilibrium the-
ory. We explore whether evolutionary forces lead to Walrasian equilibrium
in the context of a market game, introduced by Shubik (1972). Market
games have Pareto inferior (strict) Nash equilibria, in which some, and
possibly all, markets are closed. We introduce a strong version of evolu-
tionary stable strategies (SESS)f o rﬁnite populations. Our concept re-
quires stability against multiple, simultaneous mutations. We show that
the introduction of a small number of “trading mutants” is suﬃcient for
Pareto improving trade to be generated. Provided that agents lack market
power, Nash equilibria corresponding to approximate Walrasian equilibria
constitute the only approximate SESS.
Keywords: Walrasian Equilibrium, Market Games, Evolutionary Stabil-
ity
01I n t r o d u c t i o n
Walrasian equilibrium is a cornerstone of modern economics. It is, therefore,
not surprising that the question of Walrasian price formation has been the topic
of extensive study in general equilibrium theory. The tˆ atonnement process has
been used extensively in this context.1 The study of tˆ atonnement, however, has
produced largely negative results, and this has led some researchers to conclude
that decentralized information about prices alone is not suﬃcient to bring the
economy to the Walrasian equilibrium. In addition, and perhaps more impor-
tantly, the tˆ atonnement has been criticized for lacking micro foundations since
the price adjustment process is not the outcome of the individual optimization.
Even if we put the traditional stability question aside, Walrasian equilibrium
may be challenged on the basis of complexity considerations. Can “unsophis-
ticated” agents learn to behave in such a way that an outside observer of the
economy will see a Walrasian equilibrium allocation? Evolutionary game theory
seems to provide an appropriate framework to formulate this question. After all,
competitive outcomes are often justiﬁed by appealing to the natural selection
of behavior that is more “ﬁt.”2 In this paper we explore whether evolutionary
forces can lead to Walrasian equilibrium in the context of a market game, in-
troduced by Shubik (1972).3 Our story is not explicitly dynamic. Rather, we
show that any non-Walrasian outcome can be disturbed by the introduction of
a small number of “mutants,” who can become better oﬀ in relative terms by
choosing diﬀerent trading patterns.
Market games are one of the non-cooperative structures that give rise to
competitive outcomes when agents lack market power. Thus, it has served
as a non-cooperative foundation for the Walrasian equilibrium. Even in large
1See Arrow and Hurwicz (1959) for a classic reference.
2See Alchian (1950) for one of the ﬁrst attempts to formalize this argument.
3There is extensive literature on market games. Standard references include Shapley
(1977), Shapley and Shubik (1977), Dubey and Shubik (1977), and Mas-Colell (1982).
1economies, however, in addition to approximately Walrasian outcomes, market
games obtain other, Pareto inferior (strict) Nash equilibria, in which at least
some, and possibly all, markets are closed due to a coordination failure. Our
study concerns a pure exchange economy with a ﬁnite number of agents and a
ﬁnite number of goods. We study the limit case, as formalized by Postlewaite
and Schmeidler (PS, 1978), where the number of agents is large. We introduce
a strong version of evolutionary stable strategies (SESS) for asymmetric, ﬁnite
populations. Roughly speaking, SESS requires stability against all simultaneous
mutations by at most one agent per population.
We demonstrate that (partial) autarky outcomes are not SESS in an ap-
proximate sense that we make precise. A small number of suitable mutations
is suﬃcient for Pareto improving trade to be generated and for a market to
open. Thus, evolutionary forces provide an avenue through which the economy
can escape situations in which some markets are closed due to a coordination
failure. We demonstrate that in a replicated version of the game, as agents’
market power becomes insigniﬁcant, Nash equilibria that support approximate
Walrasian equilibria of the underlying economy are the only approximate SESS.4
We can summarize the intuition behind our main result as follows. A Pareto
inferior situation, in which some markets are closed, cannot be disturbed by a
single mutant. This is because a single agent cannot create beneﬁcial trade.
On the other hand, the introduction of one trading mutant on each side of the
market is suﬃcient to open a market, thus leading the economy to a Pareto
superior trading regime. All other states that involve trade, but not individual
optimization at the given prices, can be disturbed by the introduction of a single
mutant who chooses the best basket at the given prices. An important ingredi-
ent in our analysis is that the number of agents in the replicated economy under
4Our results are related to Dubey and Shubik (1978), who introduce an outside agency that
ensures that arbitrarily small amounts of bids and asks are present in all markets. Our argu-
ment, however, does not rely on the existence of this agency. In addition, we impose minimal
rationality requirements on our agents, and we explicitly consider all non-Nash outcomes.
2study is much greater than the number of possible mutants. Consequently, while
mutations can change certain agents’ baskets, they only have a negligible eﬀect
on prices. As a result, no mutations can lead to improvements, in an approxi-
mate sense, if the economy is at a Walrasian equilibrium. Thus, consistent with
the traditionally held view, our ﬁndings provide support for the popular belief
that evolutionary forces lead to competitive outcomes, but only when individual
agents are small compared to the market.5
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews some concepts from evolu-
tionary game theory, introduces our solution concept and presents an example.
In Section 3, we apply the solution concept to the market game and discuss the
main result. A brief conclusion follows.
2 The Solution Concept
We start by stating some related existing deﬁnitions of the evolutionary stability.
First, consider a population consisting of a continuum of agents. We assume
that N agents are selected from this population to play a normal-form game
Γ =( N,X,u). The standard deﬁnition of an Evolutionary Stable Strategy
(ESS) for two-player symmetric games is as follows (see Weibull, 1995):
Deﬁnition 1 x ∈ ∆ is an ESS if, for every strategy y 6= x,t h e r ee x i s t sεy > 0
such that
u(x,(1 − ε)x + εy) >u(y,(1 − ε)x + εy)
for all ε ∈ (0,εy),w h e r e∆ i sas e to fm i x e ds t r a t e g i e s .
Next, consider a ﬁnite population of size N. The deﬁnition of ESS for N-
player symmetric games is as follows (see Schaﬀer, 1988, 1989):
5This is in contrast to some recent papers in the literature, notably Vega-Redondo (1997).
See our conclusion section for further discussion.
3Deﬁnition 2 x ∈ X is an ESS if, for any strategy y 6= x,
u(x | y,x,x,...) ≥ u(y | x,x,...).




u(y | x,x,...) − u(x | y,x,x,...). (1)
We amend Schaﬀer’s (1988) deﬁnition in two ways. First, we extend the
deﬁnition of an ESS from one ﬁnite population to multiple ﬁnite populations.
Second, we build a strong version of the evolutionary stability, one that requires
stability against a simultaneous invasion of multiple mutants from diﬀerent pop-
ulations.
We will ﬁrst present the concept in the context of an example. In the next
section, we will apply it to a market game. Suppose that there are K ﬁnite
populations. Each population, i,c o n t a i n sni ≥ 2 agents. We assume that all
agents from population i play an N-player game, Γ,w h e r eN = n1+...+nK. Γ is
assumed to have the following symmetry property. All players from population
i have the same set of strategies, Xi,a n dt h es a m ep a y o ﬀ function, ui.I no t h e r
words, if two players (from the same population) play the same strategy, they
will obtain the same payoﬀs. Hence, we can write
Γ =
¡




Suppose that one player from population i plays strategy yi, while all other
players from population i play strategy xi.I fa tm o s to n ep l a y e ri ne a c hp o p -
ulation plays a strategy which is diﬀerent from the one chosen by every other











denotes the case where one player from population i plays strat-
egy yi, while all other players from population i play strategy xi.
We are now ready to deﬁne our main concept.




∈ X is a Strong ESS (SESS) if, for any
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as a function of yi, reaches its maximum value of zero when yi = xi,f o ra l lγj.





















, j 6= i.
A notable feature of the SESS is that it requires stability against up to K
simultaneous mutations (one per population). Clearly, this is a stronger concept
than Schaﬀer’s ESS. Thus, SESS will not exist in general either. An important
feature of our concept is that it can be applied to asymmetric games. Another
diﬀerence from standard evolutionary models is that instead of a continuum,
we shall assume a ﬁnite number of agents. Below, we give an example of a
4-player coordination game in which SESS uniquely selects the Pareto eﬃcient
Nash equilibrium even though there is another ESS.
Example 1. Suppose that there are two populations (I and II), each consisting
of two players. Each player has two available actions (a and b). Let θI(II) stand
5for the number of a-players in population I(II). Payoﬀsa r ed e ﬁned as follows.
uI(a,θI,θII) uI(b,θI,θII)
uI(a,1,0) = 0 uI(b,0,0) = 2
uI(a,2,0) = 0 uI(b,1,0) = 2
uI(a,1,1) = 3 uI(b,0,1) = 1
uI(a,2,1) = 3 uI(b,1,1) = 1
uI(a,1,2) = 4 uI(b,0,2) = 0
uI(a,2,2) = 4 uI(b,1,2) = 0
uII(a,θI,θII) uII(b,θI,θII)
uII(a,0,1) = 0 uII(b,0,0) = 2
uII(a,0,2) = 0 uII(b,0,1) = 2
uII(a,1,1) = 3 uII(b,1,0) = 1
uII(a,1,2) = 3 uII(b,1,1) = 1
uII(a,2,1) = 4 uII(b,2,0) = 0
uII(a,2,2) = 4 uII(b,2,1) = 0
(7)
For example, uI(a,1,0) = 0 means that the payoﬀ of the player in population I
who plays action a, when all other players (one player in population I and two
players in population II) play action b, is zero. Clearly, this is a coordination
game. It has two symmetric strict Nash equilibria in which all agents play a
and all play b, respectively. The a-equilibrium is an SESS. Notice, however,
that the b-equilibrium is not an SESS since one mutation per population (type)
to playing strategy a will result in a payoﬀ of 3 for each of the two mutants
(instead of 1 for the b-players).
Later, we shall need to make use of the following approximate notion of an
SESS.









− ²,f o ra l li, (8)








, j 6= i.
Thus, an ²-SESS requires that no mutant can be better oﬀ by more than
a small amount, ². In the next section we motivate and use both the SESS
and the ²-SESS concepts in the context of our main topic of study, a strategic
market game.
63T h e M a r k e t G a m e
3.1 Preliminaries
We consider a pure exchange economy with L consumption goods. The economy
is described by E =
­
I,wi,u i®
i∈I,w h e r eI is a ﬁnite set of agents belonging to
K diﬀerent populations (or types); ui : RL
+ → R is the utility function of agent
i,a n dwi ∈ RL
+ is the endowment vector of agent i. We assume that ui is
continuous, strictly increasing in all its variables, and strictly quasi-concave
on RL
+. Agents participate in an n-player market game related to the one in
Shapley and Shubik (1977). In what follows, we largely rely on PS in deﬁning
the market game corresponding to E.6
Let Xi = {xi =( bi,qi) ∈ RL
+ × RL
+ : qi ≤ wi} be the set of strategies of
player i. Here, bi denotes the vector of bids or “goods requested” by agent
i, measured in abstract units of account, while qi denotes the vector of goods
oﬀered by agent i. Individual agents have to satisfy a balance or bankruptcy
condition, which requires that the total value of an agent’s bid has to be less
than, or equal to, the total “receipts” from their goods sales. More precisely,

















One issue is what happens to agents who violate the balance condition.
This is particularly important in our case for two reasons. First, unlike PS,w e
explicitly consider non-Nash states in which this constraint might be violated.
Second, since agents in our model are concerned with relative performance, they
might wish to take an action that will make them worse oﬀ in absolute terms if
this would lead to other agents of their type becoming further worse oﬀ.T h i s
could occur if an action by a single agent would lead to other agents’ becoming
6We believe that our main argument will apply under alternative speciﬁcations of the mar-
ket game provided that they allow for a Nash equilibrium of a replicated game to approximate
a Walrasian equilibrium of the underlying economy.
7bankrupt. This possibility arises under the PS speciﬁcation since they assume
that agents who violate the balance condition have all their resources conﬁs-
cated. With these considerations in mind, we impose the milder assumption
that an agent whose total value of goods requested exceeds his total receipt
value has his bid vector “shaved” by an amount that is proportional to his






































l,o t h e r w i s e .
(11)
The determination of the agents’ resulting consumption baskets operates as
follows. For all i ∈ I,a n dl ∈ L,l e tci
l be the consumption of good l by agent















As usual, a strategy proﬁle b x is a Nash equilibrium if
ui(b xi,b x−i) ≥ ui(xi,b x−i), ∀i, ∀xi ∈ Xi. (13)
A Nash equilibrium is full if all markets are open. A (feasible) allocation in



















holds for all i ∈ I,t h e n
P
i∈I zi > (1 − ²)
P
i∈I wi.
Next, we state the two main results of PS. They establish the connection
between full Nash equilibria of the market game and Pareto optimal states as
well as Walrasian equilibria of the underlying economy.
8Proposition 1 (PS: Approximate Eﬃciency Theorem): For any positive num-




i∈I with wi < β(1,...1) for all i ∈ I,
P
i∈I wi > #Iδ(1,...,1)









l , and deﬁne pl = Bl/Ql to denote the
average price of commodity l (provided that the denominator of this expression
is strictly positive). Deﬁne an allocation b x resulting from a full Nash equilibrium
to be ²-Walrasian if all markets are open and there exists b p such that for all
i ∈ I, b pb xi = b pwi,a n d
#{i ∈ I : ∀e xi, e xi Âi b xi ⇒ b pe xi > b p(1 − ²)b pwi} > (1 − ²)#I, (14)
where, as stated above, prices correspond to ratios of aggregate bids. PS showed
that a full Nash equilibrium of a large enough market game is approximately ef-
ﬁcient and, in addition, it corresponds to an approximate Walrasian equilibrium
of the underlying economy.
Proposition 2 (PS: Approximate Walrasian Allocation Theorem): Under the
conditions of the Approximate Eﬃciency Theorem, full Nash equilibrium allo-
cations are ²-Walrasian.
This completes the discussion of the market game. Henceforth, we will
concentrate on the evolutionary stability of the full Nash equilibria that support
approximate Walrasian allocations.
3.2 Evolutionary Stability
Before we analyze the market game from an evolutionary point of view, we wish
to introduce the main argument in an informal way. This will also serve as a
motivating discussion for the concepts we introduced in the previous section.
First, notice that no Nash equilibrium in which some markets are closed can
9be disturbed by the introduction of a single trading mutant. This is because
at least one agent on each side of the market is necessary for any trade. While
the existence of such (partial) autarky Nash outcomes is plausible, it is also
insightful to study under what conditions evolutionary forces will result in the
“ o p e n i n go fm a r k e t s , ”l e a d i n gt oaP a r e t os u p e r i o ro u t c o m e .T oo u rk n o w l e d g e ,
ours is the ﬁrst example to demonstrate that evolutionary pressure can lead
to the opening of new markets. The fact that this requires the simultaneous
introduction of mutations from each side of the market is exactly what SESS is
designed to capture.
A separate issue from whether all markets will be open is whether evolution
will give rise to an eﬃcient or, more restrictively, to a Walrasian outcome. Hav-
ing established that no state in which some or all markets are closed corresponds
to an SESS, we turn to the question whether states that correspond to Walrasian
equilibria are SESS. Here, a diﬃculty arises. The fact that we deal with a ﬁnite
game implies that each individual agent has some market power. Of course, this
market power vanishes as the number of agents increases. This suggests that
in the case where the economy is large enough, we can expect that the above
question will be answered in the aﬃrmative, but only in an approximate sense.
To see this, let us suppose that the economy is at a full Nash equilibrium.
Suppose that an agent mutates to a diﬀerent bid/oﬀer. Clearly, since the pre-
vious situation was a Nash equilibrium, the mutant will be worse oﬀ.H o w e v e r ,
this does not imply the evolutionary stability of the full Nash equilibrium. The
reason is as follows. Since there is a ﬁnite number of agents, the mutation will
result in slightly diﬀerent prices for at least some agents. While the mutant
is worse oﬀ under the new prices, it could be that other agents of his type are
even more worse oﬀ or, in other words, the mutant could be better oﬀ in relative
terms. Thus, the evolutionary stability of the Walrasian equilibrium is not auto-
matic. A continuity argument, however, guarantees that if the economy is large
10enough, a small number of mutations cannot make the mutants better oﬀ by
more than an arbitrarily small amount. Thus, the full Nash equilibrium, which
PS have shown to be approximately Walrasian, is also an approximate SESS.
Formalizing the details of this argument is the main purpose of this section. In
what follows, we follow Debreu and Scarf (1963)7 in formalizing the notion of
a large economy. In particular, given the economy E, we will consider a replica
economy Er resulting from replicating economy E r times. The new economy,
Er,c o n t a i n srI agents, and every population increases r times. We have the
following result.
Theorem 1 Consider economy E for which the conditions of the Approximate
Eﬃciency Theorem hold. For any ²>0,t h e r ee x i s t sr ∈ N such that all full
Nash equilibrium allocations are ²-SESS for all replicas, Er, of economy E with
r ≥ r. For any allocation diﬀerent from a full Nash equilibrium allocation, there
exists ²0 > 0 and r0 > 0 such that this allocation is not an ²-SESS, where
² ∈ (0,² 0).
Proof. Since the conditions of the Approximate Eﬃciency Theorem hold, the
full Nash equilibrium allocation for the economy E is ²-eﬃcient. We assume
that all agents who have the same endowment and the same strategy choices

















l are the aggregate bids and oﬀers, for all
l ∈ L,w h i l eB =( B1,...,BL), and Q =( Q1,...,QL). Note that the function ui
r
is continuous in all its variables. Since in the full Nash equilibrium all markets
are open, we have that Bl > 0a n dQl > 0 for all l ∈ L.
7See, for example, Jehle and Reny (2001) for a more modern reference.
11It is easy to check that all conditions of the Approximate Eﬃciency Theorem
hold for economy Er, r>1. Consider a coalition of agents, C 6= ∅,c o n s i s t i n g
of at most one agent per type, who mutate to yi.L e t( e B; e Q) be the resulting
aggregate bids and oﬀers. Note that, excluding all agents i ∈ C in the new
economy, Er, the aggregate bids and asks increase by a factor of r for all goods








r(yi; e B; e Q)
¯ ¯ ¯ <
²
2








r(xi; e B; e Q)
¯ ¯ ¯ <
²
2
, for all i ∈ I/C, (17)
where yi ∈ Xi, for all i,a n de Bl(e Ql)d i ﬀer(s) from Bl(Ql) by the choice of at
most one agent per population, for all l ∈ L. Inequalities (16) and (17) follow
from the continuity of functions ui and the deﬁnition of e bi
l in expression (11).
Now, it follows immediately that
¯ ¯ ¯ui
r(xi; e B; e Q) − ui
r(yi; e B; e Q)
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In other words, a full Nash equilibrium allocation for the economy Er is an
²-SESS.
Next, consider any strategy proﬁle x l e a d i n gt o( B;Q)a n dr e s u l t i n gi na
state other than a Walrasian equilibrium. Then, there exists a coalition of
agents, C0 6= ∅, (consisting of at most one agent per type), ²0 > 0, r0 > 0, and
strategies yi for all i ∈ C0, such that for any ² ∈ (0,² 0)a n da n yr>r0,
ui




, for all i ∈ C0, (19)
12and
¯ ¯ ¯ui
r(xi; e B; e Q) − ui
r(xi;B;Q)
¯ ¯ ¯ <
²
2
, for all i ∈ I/C0. (20)
The last inequality (20) follows from the continuity of the utility function, ui
r.
Inequality (19) follows from the following observation. Consider any allocation
x in which not all markets are open. This implies that there exists a coalition of
agents, C0, such that every member of the coalition can gain by using a deviant
trade strategy yi.C h o o s e ²0 to be smaller than the minimal gain over the
members of C0. Similarly, if the initial allocation x is such that all markets are
open but diﬀerent from a Walrasian allocation, then there exists a population i
such that an agent from this population can deviate from xi to playing yi (the
best reply given strategy choices of all other agents). Such an agent will obtain
a strictly higher payoﬀ. Inequality (19) follows.
Finally, this implies that
ui
r(yi; e B; e Q) − ui
r(xi; e B; e Q) >
>
¯ ¯ ¯ui










r(xi; e B; e Q)
¯ ¯ ¯ >² . (21)
The next corollary connects our solution concept to Walrasian equilibrium.
Corollary 1 Suppose that the conditions of the Approximate Eﬃciency Theo-
rem hold. Then there exists r ∈ N such that ²-Walrasian equilibria are the only
²-SESS for or all replicas, Er, of economy E with r ≥ r.
Proof. This follows from Theorem 1 and from the Approximate Walrasian
Allocation Theorem.
It is worth mentioning that the above results will not hold in general if
the economy is populated by a small number of agents. In that case, by hav-
ing a non-negligible eﬀect on the price, an agent mutating from the full Nash
13equilibrium allocation may be able to make himself better oﬀ relative to the
other agents of his type. Therefore, full Nash equilibria may not correspond
to any ²-SESS if agents have signiﬁcant market power. While this observation
is consistent with the traditionally held view that competitive outcomes arise
when individual agents are of insigniﬁcant size, it is distinct from Vega-Redondo
(1997), in which a competitive outcome is shown to be evolutionary stable in
the context of a Cournot oligopoly model where agents have signiﬁcant market
power. This suggests that whether a partial or a general equilibrium framework
is assumed matters when determining the evolutionary stability of Walrasian
outcomes.
4C o n c l u s i o n
We studied the evolutionary stability of the Walrasian equilibrium in the con-
text of the strategic market game, introduced by Shubik (1972). We introduced
a strong version of evolutionary stable strategies, SESS, for asymmetric games
played by ﬁnite populations. SESS requires stability against multiple, simulta-
neous mutations. The introduction of a small number of “mutants” is suﬃcient
for Pareto improving trade to be generated. Thus, Pareto inferior strict Nash
equilibria where some or all markets are closed due to a coordination failure
do not constitute SESS. Provided that agents lack market power, approximate
Walrasian equilibrium outcomes are shown to be the only ²-SESS. While our
speciﬁcation of the market game closely follows the one in PS, we believe that
our analysis holds under alternative speciﬁcations provided that they allow for a
Nash equilibrium of a replicated game to approximate a Walrasian equilibrium
of the underlying economy.
An important extension of our analysis concerns the relation between our
static SESS concept and the asymptotically stable points of a suitably deﬁned
dynamic system describing the learning process. Such a dynamic system must be
14able to distinguish between Walrasian outcomes and other strict Nash equilibria
involving (partial) autarky outcomes. This extension is left to future research.
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